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Abstract: This paper reports the results from an exploratory study that sets out to identify and
compare the strategic approaches and patterns of business practice employed by 14 UK small- and
medium-sized enterprises to achieve success in themedical device sector of the health-care industry.
An interview-based survey was used to construct individual case studies of the medical device
technology (MDT) companies. A cross-case analysis was performed to search for patterns and
themes that cut across these individual cases. Exploratory results revealed the heterogeneity of MDT
companies and the distinctive features of the MDT innovation process that emphasize the
importance of a strategic approach for achieving milestones in the product development and
exploitation process and for creating value for the company and its stakeholders. Recognizing the
heterogeneity of MDT companies, these exploratory findings call for further investigation to
understand better the influence of components of the MDT innovation process on the
commercialization life cycle and value trajectory. This is required to assist start-up or spin-out
MDT companies in the UK and worldwide to navigate the critical transitions that determine access
to financial and consumermarkets and enhance the potential to build a successful business. Thiswill
be important not only for bioscience-based companies but also for engineering-based companies
aiming to convert their activities into medical devices and the health- and social-care market.
Keywords: medical device technology, small- and medium-sized enterprises, health care,
success factors
1 INTRODUCTION
The health-care marketplace has a number of
characteristics that distinguish it from those of other
sectors, particularly the influence of national and
international regulation, and the influence of the
scale and wealth of large multinational companies
on both the marketplace and the intellectual
property (IP) landscape. This adds to the complexity
and business risk of operating in the sector by, for
example, lengthening the time required for new
product development, shortening or circumventing
the period of effective exploitation of patent protec-
tion, increasing the resources and investment re-
quired for manufacturing and successful product
launch, and conditioning the route to market.
Within this marketplace, the medical device
technology (MDT) sector, in comparison with the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors of the
health-care industry, is highly heterogeneous, repre-
sented by companies active in the development and
manufacture of a diverse range of product technol-
ogies from low-technology commodity hospital
supplies such as syringes or wound dressings to
higher-technology devices and capital equipment for
disease screening, diagnosis, and therapy such as
pacemakers, stents, or X-ray machines. The US Food
and Drug Administration, in fact, recognizes about
1700 general categories of medical devices, within
which there are thousands of products consisting of
iterations and combinations of these device types
[1]. In the UK, for example, the MDT industry is
highly diversified and innovative and consist of a
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series of subsectors populated by a large number of
small organizations. (The database of a leading UK
trade association of companies providing medical
devices and related services (Association of British
Healthcare Industries) includes around 4800MDT
companies operating in the UK. 85 per cent of
health-care companies in the UK are estimated to
have a turnover of less than £5 million per year.
Larger UK companies have sales typically between
£500 million and £1 billion or more a year, and there
are also a few major foreign-owned companies,
mainly US companies [2].) With the National Health
Service (NHS) as the world’s largest health-care
delivery organization and the main UK customer for
medical device products, the MDT industry in the
UK plays a significant role in contributing to patient
care, public health, and the national economy.
The innovation process for MDT also has many
distinctive features that distinguish it from the
innovation process that characterizes the pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology sectors of the industry.
The MDT innovation process is driven by a large
share of small companies that consist of both
bioscience-based and engineering-based companies
[3]. The innovation process is therefore underpinned
by the convergence of bioscience, engineering, and
manufacturing expertise from a wide variety of
technology areas including electronics, mechanical
engineering, polymer science, chemistry, biochem-
istry, as well as bioengineering, biomaterial, and
textile sciences. Innovation in the MDT sector rarely
moves in a linear and unidirectional pattern [4].
Instead it is often a dynamic and incremental
process in which end users play a significant role
in shaping its rate and direction (i.e. development
does not end with the adoption of the innovation in
clinical practice), with medical device manufacturers
and their competitors continually developing im-
provements to existing devices.
Since the number of unknowns in a medical device
development process are usually smaller than for
the development of a new chemical compound or
biological product and because of the iterative nature
of many of the technologies produced, clinical trials
may only be required for certain classes of device that
incorporate new modes of action, or new materials
or that target new indications [1, 5, 6]. Hence the
average development time (and associated cost) for
medical devices (concept to commercialization)
varies dramatically, ranging from 1 to 2 years for
incremental devices to 5 to 7 years for radical devices,
dependent on the product type, complexity, and
degree of risk to the patient that dictates their
regulatory defined conformance and approval route.
Relatively shorter product development, product
approval, and market entry times, as well as lower
capital requirements, therefore distinguish many
medical device innovations from the development
of pharmaceuticals and biological products [7].
Hence, the demands placed on the industry are
characterized by both the range of disciplines
required to address them and the range of customers
to be satisfied by the solution. The competitive
nature of the industry, characterized by the rapid
pace of innovation, the short product life cycles, and
a patent position that can often be challenged or
circumvented, demands a huge commitment to
research and development (R&D) and amplifies the
need for a strategic approach to achieve success. For
MDT companies, this dictates their business model
and development profile, determines their external
funding requirements, and defines the selection
conditions that influence their access to consumer
markets. In order to innovate in this sector,
businesses need to understand how these con-
straints affect the development of products, their
manufacture, and their successful commercializa-
tion. Moreover, MDT businesses, especially small
businesses, need to understand the business and
financial issues in this marketplace and the business
models and strategic options that can address them
to give both short- and long-term business success
as they develop their products.
Critical success factors for product development
companies have been the subject of much research
over the last 20 years. Most of the research has
focused on information technology or the product
development processes in general. More recently,
empirically based studies have described a range of
critical success factors for biopharmaceutical com-
panies or have sought to identify business strategies
capable of producing sustainable growth for bio-
technology companies [8–12]. Few firm level studies
of MDT companies, however, have been carried out
[2, 13–15]. As described earlier, this may be because
of the highly heterogeneous nature of the sector in
which different submarkets coexist and that are
characterized by products at different stages of the
product life cycle. In the UK, for example, as a highly
diverse sector with no cohesive structure, it has been
difficult to obtain an accurate picture of its size,
structure, and dynamics [16]. A study that considers
the diversity and distinctive features of the MDT
sector and the influence on the scientific, financial,
and commercial resource requirements and time
frames for MDT development would contribute to
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an understanding of the different strategic ap-
proaches for creating value in the sector.
This exploratory study engaged the leadership of
UK small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
operating in the MDT sector in a dialogue to gain a
deeper understanding of the actions that some
individual firms have undertaken to enhance their
chances of success. The study aimed to compare and
contrast the strategic approaches employed by
successful entrepreneurs and emerging MDT com-
panies. In the first section of the paper, a series of
case studies of MDT SMEs is presented to highlight
their experiences and views on forming and building
a successful business. In the second section of the
paper the similarities in their approach are high-
lighted and the factors and attributes held to cause
success examined. The third section of the paper
discusses the strategic approaches that MDT com-
panies have taken to achieve successful milestones
in the value trajectory and identifies areas for further
work. While the present authors have placed their
work in the academic management literature, they
have chosen to use accessible business-oriented and
business-friendly frameworks to structure the results
and interpretation of their case study sample.
2 SURVEY AND METHODOLOGY
The study focused on companies drawn from the
MDT sector, whose activities were wholly or partly
focused in human health care. A convenience
sample of 14 UK MDT SMEs was selected from a
list of prospective companies and contacts con-
structed based on in-house knowledge, consultation
with industry observers, trade associations, and web-
based research. Data on each of these companies
were drawn from an interview-based survey, con-
sisting of non-confidential face-to-face conversa-
tional-style interviews with the senior managers of
each of the 14 UK MDT companies. Data from this
survey were used to construct individual case studies
and cross-case analysis performed to search for
patterns and themes that cut across the individual
cases. These data were supplemented where possi-
ble with secondary information drawn from com-
pany reports and accounts. More than half the
interviews were conducted with the chief executive
officer or managing director of the company.
A straightforward semistructured questionnaire
was constructed to guide the interview process with
nominated companies. The questionnaire was tested
by conducting pilot interviews before commence-
ment of the survey. The entire survey was conducted
between April 2004 and March 2005. The strength
of this open approach has been to allow the
interviewee to lead the discussion towards strategic
success factors that were important to the organiza-
tion rather than those that the interview team
believed to be important. Where possible, business
leaders who had equity or believed that they should
have equity in the company (i.e. where personal and
business success were coupled) were selected for
interview. This was to gain a personal view from a
business perspective and to ensure that the level of
leadership in the business was sufficiently able to
take an objective overview.
To examine the strategic approaches to the
formation, development, and operation of the
company the interviews sought to relate each
company’s business activity with its strategic actions
by addressing the following time-ordered key ques-
tions. Where were the foundations of the business?
What was the first success and how was it achieved?
What were the company’s measures of success?
What were the key stages in the growth of the
business? What strategic actions enhanced the
company’s chance of success in the marketplace?
What constraints did operating in the health-care
sector add to the ‘normal’ activities of businesses?
What were the unforeseen cusps or turning points,
and how did the company respond?
The semistructured interviews were conducted
by two senior, well-qualified, and industry-sector-
experienced interviewers and recorded using de-
tailed written notes. The data were collated and
organized into a framework that defined a core set
of categories; growth, security, marketing, people,
operations, and financing. Detailed strategic actions
and approaches were coded within this framework
and then the categories further refined to allow a
cross-case analysis to search for patterns and themes
that cut across the individual cases.
Business models embrace a generic value chain
that underlies all business activities. The value chain
segregates company activities into technologically
and economically distinct activities that it performs
to do business [17]. To explore the different ap-
proaches that entrepreneurs and businesses use to
achieve milestones in the value chain, a choice was
made to differentiate MDT companies according to
their business activity, broadly embracing the
Druilhe–Garnsey [18] proposed typology for aca-
demic spin-out companies that takes into account
the dynamics of the entrepreneurial process. Using
external indicators collected by the questionnaire
and from published data, this study has tried to
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group together companies with similar profiles in
terms of their business activity. This differentiated
the sample of companies into four main categories
of business activity: one of the companies was
involved in contract development and service provi-
sion, four companies were development companies
aiming to commercialize their product or platform
technology through licensing models, one was a
software production company, and eight were ver-
tically integrated product development companies
engaged in prototype production, high-technology
low-volume production or low-technology high-
volume production.
For the purposes of this analysis and recognizing
that delays, interruptions, and surges result in the
variations in the timing, magnitude, duration, and
rate of change in growth [19], the study has
embraced a business analyst’s view of the business
growth cycle that defines five stages of business
growth, from foundation to sale or flotation. The
bioscience business growth cycle consists of the
following [20]:
(a) stage I: companies in formation with seed or
angel financing;
(b) stage II: start-up companies looking for private
equity to establish business;
(c) stage III: rapidly growing companies with high
cash requirements – initial public offering (IPO)
candidates (?);
(d) stage IV: businesses with revenues edging
towards profitability – probably public;
(e) stage V: profitable businesses pursuing sustain-
able growth.
External indicators based on published evidence,
such as employment levels and profitability state-
ments were used to assign each company loosely to
one of these stages.
3 CASE STUDIES BY CATEGORY
The UK companies were located in England, de-
scribed regionally as the Midlands (six SMEs), East
(five SMEs), or South (three SMEs). All the survey
participants included in the study fit the SME
definition adopted by the European Commission
(Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003). For
the purpose of this study, SMEs were defined as
businesses with fewer than 250 employees, based on
headcount only. Seven companies were micro-sized
enterprises with fewer than ten full time employees
(FTEs), two were small-sized enterprises (fewer than
50 FTEs), and five were medium-sized enterprises
(fewer than 250 FTEs). The entire sample of compa-
nies had been established for 15 years or less. Many
of the companies were not yet profitable and
included two start-up companies at the beginning
of their life cycle looking for private equity to
establish the business, three rapidly growing com-
panies with high cash requirements, five businesses
with revenues edging towards profitability, and four
profitable businesses pursuing sustainable growth.
The characteristics of these companies are shown in
Table 1.
The case studies described in the following section
are described using a narrative style to reflect the
conversational style of the interviews and the open-
ness of views and perceptions expressed by the
interviewees.
3.1 Development companies
For three young emerging companies the exploita-
tion opportunity was built on the founder’s previous
knowledge and experience. Cases 1 and 2 were start-
up companies (stage II), originating from public
research institutions in 1999 and 1998 respectively.
Table 1 Characteristics of the MDT companies defined by business activity, stage of development, company size,
and core activity
Case study Business activity Growth stage Company size Core activity
1 Development II Micro Surface design technology for medical devices
2 Development II Micro Critical care diagnostic and therapeutic monitoring devices
3 Development III Small Material platform technology products, including prostheses
4 Development IV Micro Textile technology specializing in surgical implants
5 Software IV Medium Electronic patient record software
6 Service IV Micro Design and installation of clean rooms
7 Product III Micro Fluorescent probe technology
8 Product III Micro Critical care diagnostic products
9 Product IV Medium Tissue-engineered implant products
10 Product V Medium Wound-care and implant products
11 Product V Medium Medical and surgical fabrics
12 Product V Micro Medical life support equipment
13 Product IV Small Medical drug delivery inspection equipment
14 Product V Medium Automated instrumentation solutions for life sciences
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Established earlier in 1995, case 3 was a (small-sized)
more mature (stage III) and rapidly growing com-
pany. Despite recognizing the commercial potential,
cases 1 and 2 struggled initially to define their
business type because of the ubiquitous nature of
their technology and a lack of familiarity with the
medical device sector. In case 2, this had manifested
as a lack of market focus, which had inhibited their
ability to raise funding. This was resolved by
accessing resources from a local university business
school to assist with market research. In contrast,
case 3 started life as a ‘back-bedroom’ consultancy
and their market knowledge was built on personal
contacts and relationships that had been developed
over a long period. In all three cases, business
leaders participated in local business and social
network activities to access external information and
professional advice, also benefiting from the lower
transaction costs bestowed by established local
cluster networks. All three cases built protection
into their assets and value. This took the form of IP
protection (three cases) but was also supported with
the protection of manufacturing know-how (case 2).
Case 3 had implemented systems that made certain
that know-how was shared within the company, e.g.
through encouraging teamwork and retention of
skilled personnel.
In case 1, the exploitable technology was devel-
oped within a major public research institute and
was licensed from an independent technology
transfer company. This had the advantage of
providing founding investment for start-up and also
helped to raise seed funding from two independent
government-based funding sources. Case 2 relied on
a government-backed Small Firms Merit Award for
Research and Technology (SMART) and support
from private individuals for start-up. Significantly,
a further government-backed National Endowment
for Science, Technology and the Arts award enabled
the founder to switch from part-time to full-time
activities. In both cases, these public grants were
insufficient to provide longer-term financial security
and stability, making it difficult to attract high-
quality personnel. Hence, cases 1 and 2 opted to
remain small virtual businesses, outsourcing tech-
nology design and development activities and
focusing on low cash burn in order to avoid financial
exposure. In both cases this had resulted in slower
than expected value creation. Exploring the local
environment for sources of funding, both cases
found that venture capitalists were reluctant to fund
these medical device ventures because they were too
small and lacked recognizable regulatory milestones
in their product development cycle. In response,
case 2 made a strategic decision to generate a
platform device to provide a vehicle to seed devices
in research markets and with clinical advocates and
to provide an income stream via out-licensing to
enable the development of further products. Case 1,
through personal industrial connections of its leader,
had built early alliances with potential exploiters of
the technology. These had provided the resource and
financial support to complete early pilot studies of
prototypes.
In contrast, case 3 was able to use ancillary
consultancy income to fund business development
and their transition into an exploration company.
A collaborative R&D programme supported by a
joint Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council–Department of Trade and Industry grant
helped to advance the development and commer-
cialization of their core technology. This had
provided external validation of the technology and
helped to secure sufficient venture capital invest-
ment to fund the second-phase technical and
commercial development of its medical materials
and product portfolio. In response to a change in the
market that substantially elevated the potential
value of one of their portfolio products, case 3 had
undergone a transition to a product company. The
need to move the product closer to the market, and
hence the requirement for clinical trials, triggered an
organizational transition that involved the construc-
tion of multidisciplinary product development
teams, the formation of a scientific advisory board,
the implementation of formal project management
procedures, and the recruitment of a commercial
manager that understood the market. As a sign of
continued success, case 3 has recently completed
the installation of the first proprietary moulding
system for the manufacture of the company’s
unique devices.
Case 4 was a mature, established (1986), and
profitable development company (stage IV) focusing
on exploiting and developing niche markets and
providing solutions to engineering and surgical
problems using textile technologies. With participa-
tion in specific health-care and industry conferences
and connections formed through academic and
industrial networks, the founders recognized poten-
tial medical applications for their textile technolo-
gies. Detailed research of market and clinical need
identified specific opportunities and directed re-
search and development. Resources required to
develop the technology applications were harnessed
through participation in collaborative product
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development projects supported by government or
private research grants and SMART awards. This had
helped to develop licensing partnerships with se-
lected small manufacturing and marketing compa-
nies in order to bring products to market. A short and
inexpensive development process for some product
applications and a focus on nichemarkets meant that
resource requirements were relatively low, such that
value could be delivered relatively early in terms of
revenue and company credibility. Building on this
success, case 4 is continuing to develop technology
solutions to address an increasing number of medi-
cal, as well as non-health-care-related applications.
In making a strategic decision to stay small (micro),
case 4 is continuously developing partnerships with
key companies in customer sectors.
3.2 Software company
Case 5 started as a ‘one-man’ information technol-
ogy (IT) consultancy company. The exploitation
opportunity was based on an adaptation of an
existing product for a new use and market, with
the founder recognizing an opportunity to apply
newly learned skills to new fields. As a micro-SME,
the entrepreneur was able to fund expansion (head-
count) through retained profit. Early market knowl-
edge and marketing were built on personal contacts
and network activities and led to exploratory work in
two applications areas that proved fundamental to
success for case 5. These contracts, in both health-
care and non-health-care industry sectors, estab-
lished the company as an IT consultancy business.
The key to exploiting the health-care opportunity
was in building early demonstrators for adopters to
look at and for others to follow, coupled with the
recruitment of health-care-experienced people and
health-care ‘champions’ that were well placed in the
national standardization bodies and that were well
known in the industry sector.
Case 5 began to participate in specific conferences
and training courses to identify potential sources of
new business and to raise the profile of the
company, gradually establishing the company as
an expert in their field. Connections cultivated
through conference participation and through the
development of their own training courses (which
provided a low-cost effective form of sales promo-
tion) opened up opportunities in new tech-
nology fields and earned contracts with large blue-
chip organizations. These contracts provided a
steady income stream but were short lived because
larger competitors were able to offer better-quality
compliance systems, which industry and govern-
ment purchasing agencies such as the NHS required.
This signalled a transition for case 5. Realizing it
needed to make its software engineering process
more formalized, it implemented a quality manage-
ment system and ISO 9001 certification, which
became an important part of the marketing platform
that helped case 5 to sustain its growth.
In response to fundamental changes in the envir-
onment in which the company operated, case 5
identified two new opportunities in global e-com-
merce and NHS IT programmes. Recognizing that
large organizations and state bodies operate routines
for evaluating potential new suppliers that examine
financial status, staff number, and facilities, case 5
needed to increase its headcount and to relocate to
accommodation that reflected their sales offering and
that would allow it to grow. This signalled the change
from a niche consultancy company to both a product
company and application service provider. The
company restructured, strengthened the manage-
ment team, relocated to new premises, and began to
form alliances with global IT organizations to build up
a value chain. The new corporate structure made it
easier to manage and, in making it more attractive to
private investor’s, case 5 was able to secure business
angel investment to fund its next growth stage and to
prepare for an IPO.
3.3 Service company
Case 6 was a micro service-based profitable engi-
neering business (stage IV), designing and installing
clean rooms for multiple markets such as the
pharmaceutical industry and the NHS. The exploita-
tion opportunity was built on the founder’s previous
knowledge and experience in a related industry
sector, recognizing an opportunity to apply learned
skills in other fields. Case 6 started life as a ‘back-
bedroom’ consultancy, which provided an income
stream to enable the development of its service
application. Using retained profit, the entrepreneur
was able to increase headcount and to relocate the
business to facilities that reflected their sales offering
and allowed the company to grow. To this end, the
founder spent time recruiting the ‘right’ people;
these were people with the personalities that fitted
the existing company culture and that allowed the
founder to focus more on fee-earning activities.
Market knowledge was built on personal contacts
and relationships that had been developed over a
long period. Recognizing that regulatory constraints
could be an impediment, case 6 accessed external
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professional resources to gain a thorough under-
standing of the regulatory environment of the
market for which the service offering was intended.
This led to the development of a standardized
service application package for individual target
markets. In order to find a route to market, a
demonstrator clean room facility was designed and
built, providing visibility and demonstrated value to
end users. This was a key activity for building an
early, small customer base. Recognizing a new
opportunity, this demonstrator was also used as an
operational unit to provide a clean-assembly service
to medical device companies and provided the
stimulus for the development of a new business
strand offering the installation of modular clean
rooms in containers or portakabins. The ‘lowest-
bidder’ public sector procurement culture, however,
hindered sales to the mainstream NHS market.
Hence, the approach that case 6 adopted to facilitate
the marketing and bidding processes and to expedite
the route to market shifted to the identification and
targeting of end users in overseas markets in order to
showcase their value solution and to seek strategic
alliances with companies who had complementary
(high-margin) product capabilities.
3.4 Young product companies
For two young emerging product-oriented companies
the exploitation opportunity was built on the foun-
der’s previous knowledge and connections. Cases 7
and 8 were rapidly growing companies (stage III),
established in 2000 and 2002 respectively, but emer-
ging via two very different routes. In case 7, the
founder acquired existing IP owned by the originating
university. As a medical microsystems company, case
8 originated from a joint venture between two large
organizations in the electronics and life sciences
industries to exploit technology and IP developed
primarily by one of the parent companies. In both
cases, the starting resources included exploitable
technology that was relatively mature. For case 7,
this meant that resources required to reach the
market were relatively low for its lead product and it
was therefore able to deliver value and to realize
revenues relatively early. In case 7, the exploitation
opportunity was identified and built on a lengthy and
detailed market research process by the founder.
Start-up activities were sustained using ancillary
consultancy income to fund business development,
to acquire existing IP from a local university and to
patent the technology. The founder participated in
local business and social network activities to access
external professional patent and legal advice. A
perceived lack of stability hindered initial resource
expansion but the recruitment of key business and
research personnel was achieved with the offer of a
small equity stake in the company. Case 7 accessed
Government research grants in order to expand its
product pipeline but, in contrast with case 8, followed
an organic development path, relying mostly on self-
financing following the provision of initial funding by
the founder and board members.
Case 8 had the advantage of being able to secure
seed investment from both parent companies,
allowing it to invest in early preclinical trials in
order to demonstrate value, which was to prove
significant in later funding rounds. Further develop-
ment of the technology continued to be outsourced,
leveraging links to academic communities and
academic partners to exploit complementary tech-
nologies that added value to their product portfolio.
Case 8, however, needed further commercial funds
to develop the technology to a point closer to
market. With a strong founding team and board
with relevant industrial experience and track record
in place (many originating from the parent compa-
nies) and the early demonstration of value, case 8
was able to raise first-round private equity funding
to continue the development of their microchip-
based medical products, despite the reluctance of
some venture capitalists to invest. This funding
prompted a major organizational transition in terms
of scale (doubling of headcount) and competency,
with recruitment of a new core technical team and
medical advisory board as part of its strategy to
increase the commercial applications of the core
technology microanalyser system. Consequently,
case 8 has recently relocated to larger premises,
and its ongoing success has been recognized with
two prestigious innovation awards.
Both case 7 and case 8 had an explicit strategy to
engage key opinion leaders (KOLs) in a number of
the world’s leading hospitals or research centres in
the USA and Europe. These relationships were used
to generate specific data that was applied to fine-
tune the technology and also to produce reference
publications that demonstrated value to potential
customers and multinational marketing and distri-
bution partners. For case 7, the route to market was
built on seeding the product in research markets in
order to exemplify product performance through key
research publications in journals and conferences.
This built up an early small customer base and
provided visibility to potential users. To increase the
customer base it was necessary to identify specific
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applications in niche markets that would create
value for the company. Recognizing the differences
between the early and mainstream customer groups,
the founder developed marketing and promotional
tactics based on the differential design of product
data sheets for target customer groups with different
characteristics (the early adopters and the early
majority). This was supported by the implementa-
tion of a direct sales distribution channel (via the
internet) in order to reduce the time to establish a
sustainable market position. To expedite the route to
market, case 7 is now seeking strategic alliances with
companies who have complementary products that
are already selling into the identified niche markets.
With the success of its first two products, and the
recent launch of a third, case 7 has experienced
increasing sales growth and growing profitability.
3.5 Mature product companies
Four cases (cases 9, 10, 11, and 12) were mature
product-oriented companies, established between
1990 and 1996 (stages IV and V). Case 9, established
in 1996 was a medium-sized profitable company that
built on an existing patented wound-care product
arising from academic research in the 1970s. To find a
route to market it was necessary to identify specific
applications that would create value for the company.
Although licensed for use in humans, a lack of clinical
efficacy evidence was impeding sales. In response,
case 9 recruited a professional services manager with
extensive knowledge of the market and focused their
resources to engage end users (i.e. surgeons) in a
market evaluation programme with the aim of
gathering and publishing clinical efficacy data in the
medical press.
With increasing UK sales growth for their first
product, case 9 went through a lengthy process to
identify market segments and clinical need targeted
at specific niche surgical applications to avoid large
competitor markets. An expansion of product devel-
opment activities was focused on broadening their
portfolio of market applications in both existing and
new surgical fields of application. However, like case
7, case 9 had difficulties accessing the UK NHS
market because of the complicated purchasing
decisions and multiple buying routes. Recognizing
that the buying decisions in the NHS come from
technical specialists such as surgeons, case 9
refocused their marketing strategy towards providing
specific solutions to end users through the devel-
opment of collaborative clinical projects. Connec-
tions with KOLs and the resulting publication and
presentation of independent evidence at specific
conferences were critical in attracting strategic
marketing partners in a number of US and European
Union (EU) target market segments. Knowledge and
experience of the new fields in which the technology
could be applied were, however, limited and pro-
vided the stepping point for transition to a new
management team that recognized the differences
between the EU and US markets. Recognition that
the high-risk technology applications required reg-
ulatory approval to bring the product to market, case
9 was prompted to mobilize resources in order to
increase their understanding of the regulatory
environment of the market for which their product
was intended. This signalled a transition in the
business structure. Since having control of their
manufacturing was an important strategic goal
(recognized as important in the new generation of
biologically based medicines [21]), this triggered the
requirement for additional resources (both financial
and human) to bring product manufacturing activ-
ities in house and to manage the resource impact of
attaining regulatory compliance in the EU and the
USA. With increasing product sales, the board was
restructured to focus resources to suit the future
needs of company and to prepare for launch of the
company on the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM) in the UK. Since flotation on the AIM, case
9 has continued to increase sales growth and to
generate profits and returns to shareholders.
Cases 10 and 11 were well-established (established
in 1990 and 1995 respectively) manufacturing off-
shoots of larger organizations. Both were medium-
sized and profitable companies that had made the
transition from a non-health-care business strand
into medical products, adapting existing technology
for a new use and market. Initially supplying low-
cost commodity products to mass markets, the
income stream derived from these early sales,
together with the income from non-health-care
business strands, provided a regular income stream
for both companies. In both cases, the transition to a
medical product company triggered the mobilization
of internal R&D resources to support new product
development programmes in diversified market
areas. Integral to these programmes was a strategy
to exert leverage on established links to academic
communities, end users, and connections with
companies with complementary technologies, to
identify new market opportunities, to build partner-
ships for the development of new products, and to
access the necessary clinical trial and regulatory
approval expertise. As a world-leading manufacturer
724 P C Hourd and D J Williams
Proc. IMechE Vol. 222 Part H: J. Engineering in Medicine JEIM125 F IMechE 2008
of surgical suture material, case 10 has continued to
increase its turnover. The recent successful comple-
tion of an early-phase UK-based clinical trial for one
of its medical implant devices has marked its
successful diversification into other medical device
business areas.
In its early transition to health care, case 11 brought
in a business development manager with extensive
experience of the wound-care market to expedite its
entry into the new primary care market. Expansion
of the sales team and investment in new product
development widened the scope of their product
range and widened their national UK presence. As
sales began to grow, the sales team needed to be
expanded so that individual buyers (i.e. general
practitioners (GPs) and nurse prescribers) in the
primary care market could be targeted. This was
achieved by combining its internal sales team with
those of one of its collaborative partners. An increased
revenue stream was used to continue new product
development, focusing on niche market segments.
However, like previous cases (case 7 and 9), case 11
had difficulty accessing the UK NHS market. Recog-
nizing that the NHS was uniquely divided into a
number of mini markets, resources were mobilized to
obtain a clearer view of the routes to market and the
individual buyer targets. The market strategy for new
product introduction was to target end users in NHS
hospitals (technical specialists who make the buying
decisions) through the direct provision of application
training. Accessing these individuals needed the
support of KOLs who set the standards for product
performance and usage in the relevant market (e.g.
wound-care formularies). Relationships with KOLs
were built by involving them in the early product
evaluation or clinical trial processes. With further
sales growth and diminishing non-health-care-re-
lated income, case 11 continued to develop new
products and to identify exploitable opportunities
through connections with suppliers. Eventually, in-
creasing product complexity and expanding sales
prompted substantial organizational transition to
cope with the need for an increasing clinical skills
base and production capacity.
Case 12 was a small well-established (established
in 1990) and profitable micro-sized company spe-
cializing in the design and manufacture of medical
life support equipment for hospitals. In the face
of increasing competition, a change in leadership
and leadership style led to a realignment of their
business strategy towards a cost-down (unit-price)
approach. This resulted in a remodelled distribution
path, established via a strategic partnership with a
distribution company to provide a direct and cost-
effective route to EU markets. Close relationships
were built with small precision engineering suppliers
to reduce costs and to ensure quality component
supply. As a mature company with an established
productive base, case 12 chose to evolve its product
design and to sustain its innovative base by investing
in a substantial R&D programme, ploughing their
retained profit into updating and expanding its
product line in order to stay ahead of the competi-
tion. To achieve this, case 12 had to learn a whole
new set of product design skills, which was sup-
ported with external professional advice accessed
through participation in local business and technical
networks. To maintain an up-to-date understanding
of potential issues and customer expectations in
their target markets, a thorough understanding of
the regulatory environment of the market for which
the products were intended was built through
establishing a good relationship and rapport with
the regulator or notified body.
Case 13 was a rapidly growing provider of modular
X-ray imaging technology solutions to system inte-
grators and distributors, with part of its business
strand in health care. The exploitation opportunity
was built on the founder’s previous knowledge and
experience, which was founded on previous expo-
sure to venture capitalists and the due diligence
process. Through a similar IP prospecting process to
that used by the founder of case 7, the founder of
case 13 brought together a team of commercial,
technical, and academic parties to form the com-
pany and entered into exclusive arrangements to
exploit IP from a local university.
The exploitation opportunity was identified and
built on a lengthy and detailed market research
process. It was clear that, given the market oppor-
tunity for the application of the core technology, and
given the need for clinical trials, the resources
required to commercialize the technology would be
considerable. Rather than constructing a ‘mega’
business plan to attract massive amounts of money,
case 13 chose to operate a stepwise development
plan that exposed the application of the technology
to potential customers, acquirers, and licensees
(selling or exit points on the value trajectory) at
various stages of the development plan. Start-up
activities were sustained using ancillary consultancy
and service income based on the expert knowledge
of the founder. Case 13 also relied on a SMART
award and support from local agency grants to
complete proof-of-principle studies. At each stage of
business development, time was spent on recruiting
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the ‘right’ people; people with the personalities that
fitted the existing company culture. This was
coupled to an organizational transformation that
was aimed at losing some of the trappings of
academic culture and increasing the credibility of
the company. Their product development process
was integrated with a continuous assessment of
market and competitor intelligence (especially ‘big
business’), coupled with a thorough understanding
of the regulatory environment of the market for
which the ‘product’ was intended. The demonstrator
technology was positioned in order to build up key
end-user reference sites in the marketplace, provid-
ing visibility to potential partners. This led the
company to design and build a range of X-ray
systems for a number of applications and customers
and secure strategic sales and marketing agreements
with leading equipment suppliers. The company has
recently successfully completed an AIM launch,
demonstrating real value to equity holders.
Case 14 is a world leader in the design, develop-
ment, manufacture, and integration of advanced
industrial automation solutions for the life science
industries. Resulting from a demerger of an existing
organization, start-up was built on financial support
from a number of private individuals and sustained
initially using ancillary consultancy income to fund
business development. The founders were experi-
enced engineers with business knowledge and experi-
ence but were relatively unfamiliar with the bioindus-
try and its market. A lengthy prospecting process that
built an industry and market picture led to the
recognition of a specific productive opportunity. To
find a route to market it was necessary to identify
specific areas in the bioindustry that would create
value for the company. Although the channels and
lines of reporting were unclear and a great deal of time
was spent talking to the wrong people, existing
connections within the pharmaceutical industry, built
through its consultancy role, provided initial access (a
‘Trojan horse’) to its target market. The recruitment of
life science graduates with skills and experience in
both life science and instrumentation camps was a
key step in expanding its commercial function. These
were people who spoke the customer’s language and
were able to translate customer need into product
specifications. Finding these people was difficult and
constituted high overheads but ultimately led to the
first commercial success for case 14.
An expanding knowledge base, built through
direct industrial contacts, triggered the recognition
of a specific commercial opportunity in new emer-
ging application fields and signalled the transition to
a discovery company for case 14. The recruitment of
an experienced marketing professional with a sig-
nificant and intimate knowledge of the marketplace
and hence the vision to see industry and market
trends accelerated this transition. Supported by
regulatory advice from external resources, case 14
gained a thorough understanding of the regulatory
environment of the market for which the ‘product’
was intended. Understanding that they needed to
operate within a completely different set of ‘rules’
from the normal technology or manufacturing
business, case 14 directed its efforts towards the
development of a standardized product package for
its target market. Recognizing that early and visible
adopters can profoundly alter the uptake of novel
solutions among the followers, the founder’s strategy
was to place the technology with lead customers as
early as possible. As an engineering company, this
was a key element in understanding the expectations
of their customers and ensuring that bioscience
companies understood their technology. As sales
grew, an apparent rise in competition triggered a
change in strategy for case 14. In contrast with case
13, which chose to increase its R&D output, case 14
chose to compete on price, by sharpening market-
ing, delivery, and manufacturing activities and by
protecting the IP position (prior to this, case 14 did
not have the cash or position to protect IP). As the
company grew to a medium-sized enterprise and
with a changing commercial environment, the
management structure was changed, bringing in
new people with more specific experience relevant
to the size of the business and the marketplace.
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:
OBSERVATIONS OF KEY FACTORS
The concept of success is difficult to define clearly,
but the criteria that delineate success dictate the
company’s commercial objectives and the strategies
that it implements to achieve them [22]. In this study,
success has been defined in terms of milestones for
successful performance. The case studies show that
these had different scales of measure, encapsulated in
the value creation process, such as conducting an
IPO, having a product candidate commence or
complete a successful clinical trial, launching a
product candidate on the market, achieving signifi-
cant financial turnover, or signing a major corporate
partnering deal (Table 2). The scale of success for
companies included in this study was defined by their
business activity and by their stage of development.
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In the following section, attempts are made to
compare and contrast the strategic approaches that
these MDT SMEs have used to create and control
their sources of value. Each case study has illustrated
some of the key factors that their entrepreneurs and
business leaders have used to achieve milestones in
their business formation, development, and opera-
tion. To simplify and guide the discussion, the
responses from the interviews were synthesized into
a core set of categories which were further refined
into a number of broad categories defined according
to the strategic elements described by the Institute of
Directors (IoD) (a UK membership organization for
directors responsible for company strategy) for the
growth of the firm and the creation of a valuable
business from a growth, profitability, and security
viewpoint [23]. Figure 1 provides an overview of
these strategic elements and a framework for guiding
the following discussion.
4.1 Investment in strong personnel resource
Investment in strong personnel resource was a
common theme, focused on creating a team-based,
engaged, and incentivized working culture and also
based on the recruitment of the right people at the
right time, not just for their expertise but also for
their attitude. For the more established companies
(stages III to V), this was linked with an increase in
scale (in terms of personnel numbers and function-
ality) or a change in business structure in response
to the new demands that were placed on their
functional elements. More than half the product-
development-driven companies (stages III to V), for
example, had channelled their research into more
standardized product and process development
activities, which had driven the need for the
introduction of tightly integrated cross-functional
teams, disciplined project management practices,
and professional managers to achieve product
development or clinical trials milestones. The ap-
proach of these companies in response to the
recognition of new exploitable opportunities was to
build a skills base that matched the market,
integrating the technology and application strands
of the business, allied to the recruitment of top-level
marketing personnel with an intimate knowledge of
the market. For two cases, whose historical back-
ground and culture were in engineering disciplines,
this was particularly important since it allowed them
to establish links with the bioscience-based com-
pany network and research base, as well as the
health-care marketplace.
Table 2 Measure of success for case study companies
Company characteristics Measures of success
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1 Development II Micro q q q
2 Development II Micro q q
3 Development III Small q q q q
4 Development IV Micro q q q q q
5 Software IV Medium q q q q q
6 Service IV Micro q q q
7 Product III Micro q q q
8 Product III Micro q q q q
9 Product IV Medium q q q q q q q q
10 Product V Medium q q q q q
11 Product V Medium q q q q
12 Product V Micro q q q q
13 Product IV Small q q
14 Product V Medium q q q
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Often allied with step changes within the core
management team capabilities and in the structure
and dynamics of the board of directors, three
quarters of the established and rapidly growing
companies (stages III to V) had changed their
business structure to achieve financial milestones
and to overcome the changes and disruption that
organizational transition brings. Signalling their
organizational maturity, many of the established
SMEs were led by professional managers. Except for
the two product companies that had made the
transition from non-health-care business strands,
these established companies together with the
emerging MDT development and product compa-
nies were or had been set up and led by individuals
with knowledge and experience in industry. These
were entrepreneurs or leaders that characteristically
recognized market demand and that had a realistic
view of the market. These entrepreneurs character-
istically invested their own equity in the business in
cash or ‘sweat’ (opportunity cost) and typically were
able to match their intuitive knowledge of the
market demand with a technological opportunity
(opportunity recognition) [18]. These were people
who ‘see a way to make things happen and to do it’
(i.e. people with vision, who embrace change, and
who take and manage risk). In many cases it was the
skill and vision of the entrepreneur or leader that
had been a fundamental factor for success. Their
individual behaviour and social capital were impor-
tant, but frequently these leaders were also part of a
founding team with complementary expertise that
added value to the company.
4.2 Securement of financial resources
Many of the MDT projects that the development
companies and emerging product businesses were
undertaking were or had been ‘bootstrapped’, with
entrepreneurs building on insider finance (‘founder,
Fig. 1 Classification of case study observations: the success factor categories were classified according to the IoD
framework illustrated in the top part. The lower part summarizes the number of companies (above the
columns) that mentioned or emphasized specific success factors within each category during the interviews.
Key for business activity: horizontal lined column, development company; grey column, service company;
shaded column, software company; white column, product company
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family, friends, and fools’), customer contracts, bank
loans, or government grants and continuously
pursuing funding to raise as much money as
possible even when it was not seen as essential for
the subsequent growth of the company at that time.
This approach tended to be strategic and opportu-
nistic, indicative of the entrepreneur’s attitude to
risk taking and debt management. This compares
more closely with projects in the electronic and
engineering industry than with product develop-
ment projects in the biotechnology and pharmaceu-
tical sectors. Two established product companies
had incorporated health-care activities in a cross-
sectorial product portfolio, generating income from
‘old’ non-health-care business strands to finance
new product development. Showing characteristics
of the Bullock [24] hardening model, half of the MDT
companies, particularly the technology platform,
equipment supply, and software SMEs had made
the transition from ‘soft’ companies, generating
early income by selling ancillary consultancy and
services, to ‘hard’ companies that sell products. With
business models directed towards building cash flow
from non-equity sources these companies were able
to increase productivity in the product development
process. The cash flow allowed them to strengthen
company infrastructure, to establish networks, to
reduce the amount of time that the management
team needed to spend on raising subsequent rounds
of fundraising and ultimately to focus their efforts on
the product development process to reduce the
chances of failure. These companies had the flex-
ibility to adopt and explore new and emerging
opportunities for development, emphasized by the
record of several cases that had identified and
developed a number of new products.
It was evident that the sources of finance that the
MDT businesses needed to access changed accord-
ing to the growth stage of the company and the level
of funding required. Seed financing provided a
common route for converting innovative research
ideas into a business proposition. Small company
support schemes such as SMART grants, and the
government-backed LINK programmes in the UK,
for example, provided access to start-up funding for
young development and product companies (stages
II and III) but were generally insufficient to move the
product closer to market. Nevertheless, the attitude
of companies to external private finance as a route
for start-up or first-round funding was mixed. Two of
the development companies (cases 1 and 2), for
example, experienced difficulties in accessing ven-
ture capital because, in their view, venture capitalists
were reluctant to fund start-up companies, particu-
larly because of regulatory uncertainty and the
unpredictable regulatory pathways associated with
the medical device sector that make the product
development milestones less than clear. In response
to these funding shortages, these companies chose
to restrict their growth plans, to conserve their
existing resources, and to seek alternative sources
of funding through corporate finance or product
licensing deals. This had served to lengthen the time
needed to reach the next valuation point or product
development milestone.
4.3 Creation of a business that is narrowly
focused
According to the IoD, narrowly focused businesses
are the most likely to create value but are also at the
greatest risk of failing [23]. All but one of the MDT
companies had chosen to minimize the inherent
risks of technological innovation through diversifi-
cation into related product areas and businesses or
by outsourcing non-core activities. Development
companies (stages II to IV) had chosen to reduce
risk by outsourcing large components of their R&D
and product development activities. Product com-
panies (and the service company) had increased the
scope of their customer base, either by expanding
into other application areas and markets for their
product(s) or service or by expanding into other
related product and service or business areas. This
was emphasized by case 11, which had expanded
their market share from the accident and emergency
market to the primary care market and case 9 that
had expanded product development into related
therapeutic areas with a degree of research crossover
(i.e. niche surgical applications). This was also
highlighted in other cases in which companies had
broadened product pipelines with the development
of related products and services or had differentiated
into non-health-care product strands.
4.4 Establishment of strategic alliances
Case studies revealed the prevalence of strategic
partnerships in the value chain. All the MDT
companies had established a network of one or
(usually) more collaborations, strategic alliances
(and consortia), or partnerships to exploit compe-
tencies and expertise along the value trajectory to
access downstream capabilities in the areas of
product development, manufacturing, clinical trials,
and/or marketing and distribution. In forming
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vertical alliances with companies who had similar
products, more than half the product companies
(stages III to V) had expedited access to US and EU
distribution channels or had facilitated expansion of
sales teams. These vertical alliances were typically
through licensing or joint commercialization and
distribution deals with larger companies operating
closer to the end user. Other key partnerships
involved the use of vertical alliances to share the
cost of clinical trial programmes, to augment access
to manufacturing and regulatory capability, and to
access complementary technologies in order to
strengthen bidding processes or broaden product
pipeline. Horizontal alliances were also featured, in
which four of the established companies (stages IV
and V) had formed alliances for the purposes of joint
new product or prototype R&D.
4.5 Focus on the market and market strategy
For product companies, the marketing process
demands that they access the relevant management
and marketing capabilities to establish entry into the
market and to achieve these financial milestones.
Rather than utilizing existing in-house resources
[15], for more than half the cases (including three
young companies, stages II and III) this was allied to
the recruitment of senior-level marketing and sales
expertise from the target market or that was well
networked to the target market. However, unlike new
and approved pharmaceutical products that are
perhaps more likely to be accepted by the market,
medical device companies involved in the develop-
ment and commercialization of highly innovative
and technology-intensive products faced additional
marketing challenges, particularly those companies
seeking to introduce technologies that cause disrup-
tion to current clinical practices. The record of three
cases that had difficulties accessing the NHS high-
lights this point.
All the cases targeted market niches for specific
applications, defined, for example, by therapeutic
area within subsectors of the medical device in-
dustry, such as orthopaedic implantable devices,
bandages for leg ulcers, neonatal respiratory equip-
ment, surgical implants, and in-vitro diagnostics.
More than half of these were targeting broader niche
markets. In a staged strategy for new product
introduction, their approach has been to demon-
strate early competitive advantage in the market,
based on the production of prototype demonstra-
tors, early pilot studies in reference sites, the
provision of clinical practice education and training
(i.e. GP and practice nurse training for step change
products). Two product companies (stages IV and V),
for example, had created their broader operational
base by initially targeting and establishing leader-
ship in small segmented markets with the expressed
desire to avoid competition with large competitors. A
marketing strategy that focused on a leveraged
approach to niche market segments or mini-markets
in the mainstream market, which has typified the
tactics of rapidly growing companies in other
industries [25–27], had been utilized by these
companies to gain visibility and credibility, to
generate revenue, and to attempt to establish
leadership. Significantly, the marketing and sales
efforts of these companies parallel those described
by Moore [27], based on his work in the high-
technology industry (in particular the IT sector), for
‘crossing the chasm’ into the mainstream market.
Moore [27] has popularized Rogers’ [25] seminal
work on the diffusion of innovations, making it
readily accessible to a business audience by describ-
ing an adoption life-cycle model to emphasize the
importance of marketing within the high-technology
industry, particularly the IT sector. According to
Moore, the chasm represents the ‘gulf between two
distinct marketplaces for technology products’. The
first marketplace consists of a group of individuals
who ‘are quick to appreciate the nature and benefits’
of a new technology and therefore will buy the
product without any prior endorsements. The other
marketplace, however, contains everyone else: those
people who want and will buy the new product, but
only after the product has been utilized and shown
to have a demonstrated value.
More than half the companies, including the
development, product, and software companies,
had also sought relationships and collaborations
with change agents or KOLs early in their product
evaluation process to open routes to the technical
specialists who make the buying decisions in the
NHS, i.e. surgeons, nurses, and GPs. Combined with
the production of reference publications and con-
ference participation, this served to raise the profile
of the company, to validate their technology, and to
improve their access to customers, to partners, and
even to finance. For the product companies, in
particular, the capacity to modify or reorient their
market strategy was facilitated by ‘probe-and-learn’
processes that typify product development in the
MDT industry [7]. This was emphasized by the
product-oriented cases, in which adoption by prac-
titioners in clinical practice often served as the
beginning of an iterative process of refinement and
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improvement and as a precursor to selling in the
early market.
Product companies, and in particular the estab-
lished equipment supplier companies and the low-
technology high-volume product companies (stages
IV and V), put great emphasis on traditional com-
ponents of market orientation, including protect-
ing the market with strong customer relationships
and spending time and resources on knowing and
continued understanding of their customers and
competitors. These companies stressed the impor-
tance of defending the threats arising from exposure
to large competitors, e.g. by forming consortia or
alliances or by increasing their competitive advan-
tage in terms of clinical competencies. In order to
circumvent the poor distribution systems that are
often associated with medical devices, four of the
product companies had implemented early distribu-
tion plans using a direct sale-and-supply strategy or,
in the case of one SME, had created a separate
distribution business for their own and other
products that operated in parallel with their design,
manufacturing, and assembly business.
4.6 Protection of assets
IP, usually in the form of patents, plays a major role
in building sustainable advantage for many health-
care SMEs and provides positive signals of compe-
tencies for potential investors. The development
companies and more than half of the product
businesses recognized the importance of building
protection into their assets and value. On the other
hand, the technology platform companies (including
services and software) did not rely on patent protec-
tion as a barrier to competition, relying instead on
asset protection that took the form of protecting
know-how.
4.7 Anticipation and response to change
Several companies demonstrated the flexibility to
anticipate and respond to negative or positive
external change drivers, by exploiting the opportu-
nities or defending the threats arising from new
legislative and regulatory compliance requirements,
or to changes in the market. The record of case 11,
for example, that developed new products in
response to implementation of British Standards in
the bandage market, case 5 that restructured its
business to exploit opportunities arising from a
moratorium on health-care procurement of infor-
mation communication technology, and case 3 that
transitioned from a consultancy to an exploration
company in response to a change in the market serve
to highlight this point.
4.8 Investment in operations and quality focus
Investment in R&D and continuous innovation for
new products or technology was at the forefront of
all the activities of the product-oriented cases. Two
of these companies had also invested in new
manufacturing facilities to increase productivity.
Recognizing the quality assurance focus of MDT
regulatory systems and the requirements of industry
customers and purchasing agencies, all the product
and development companies had invested in reg-
ulatory expertise or in implementing quality systems
to manage design control and regulatory compliance
as a means of creating strategic competitive advan-
tage. Monitoring the capability of their product
against market need as they evolved and improved
their understanding of the market was a key part of
this process for matching that need.
4.9 Serendipity
Even for established companies, success is often the
outcome of serendipity. Three of the companies
(stages IV and V) admitted that luck had played a
part in their success but also emphasized that they
had put themselves in positions (via targeted
networking) where they were most likely to find
and take advantage of serendipitous events.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on an exploratory study of 14 MDT companies
in the UK, this paper highlights the diversity of
technologies and target application markets in this
sector. The challenges for the MDT companies were
conditioned by their business activity, the physical
and philosophical starting points of the company
(i.e. academia or large industry), and the maturity of
their resources. For the start-up companies, in
particular, this was congruent with the findings of
other empirical studies of new venture growth [18].
However, the case studies emphasize the impor-
tance of a strategic approach to achieve success in
this sector, irrespective of whether the companies
are new start-up development companies or mature
and established product-focused companies (sum-
marized in Fig. 2).
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The study revealed that progression through the
business growth life cycle is underpinned by the
achievement of milestones in the product develop-
ment and exploitation process that create value
for the company. This strongly coupled the pro-
duct development and financial cycles for these
companies because value creation relied on creating
prototypes or demonstrators, moving products
through the clinical trial phases and obtaining
regulatory approval for product launch. The busi-
ness activity of the company has therefore defined
how the company was resourced, the way it created
Fig. 2 What strategic approaches have MDT companies taken to achieve successful milestones
in the value trajectory?
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value, and where and how value was realized in this
cycle.
The attraction, retention, and incentivization of
personnel and managers were key competencies
exhibited by many of the MDT companies. These
companies brought together the scientific innova-
tion of researchers with the commercial expertise
and social capital of managers and founders that
were able to sell their ideas and eventual products to
potential investors and buyers. This represented an
important endowment for organizations in the early
stages of their development [28]. Compatible with
the findings of other empirical studies of new
ventures, the case studies of the young product
and development companies (stages II and III), for
example, showed that the exploitation opportunity
was built on the founder’s previous knowledge and
experience. The difficulties in defining their business
type, lack of familiarity with the medical device
sector, and a lack of market focus were resolved by
the evolving experience of the entrepreneur and the
ability to use their networking activities to mobilize
resources [18].
The case studies show that, as the companies
navigated the business growth cycle, their business
structures changed in response to the new demands
that were placed on their functional elements, such
as product development, clinical trials, financial
management, manufacturing, sales, and marketing.
In response to the increasingly complex technical
and business challenges, these companies signifi-
cantly redefined the scale and structure of their skills
base to exploit competencies at various transition
points along the value trajectory. The business
model determined the demand for organizational
transition, in terms of both function and scale, as the
company progressed along their product develop-
ment path. For development companies, for exam-
ple, the scale of this transition was different because
it was not embodied in the development of a
physical productive base or in manufacturing or
marketing products [18]. In managing the organiza-
tional transition within the product development
cycle and investing in the appropriate resource
competencies, the business leaders of these MDT
companies had avoided significant disruptions and
delays in reaching their milestones.
For the product-focused companies, the complex-
ity of the product development process and the
regulatory compliance burden established the time
frame in which the company operated, the stake-
holders and customers that it needed to satisfy, and
the scope and scale of its value-adding activities. By
lengthening the time required for new product
development and increasing the investment re-
quired for manufacturing and successful product
launch, the period in which these companies
experienced zero product revenue and high burn
rate was lengthened. This meant that the majority of
product companies (i.e. those without a non-health-
care or mature product stream) relied heavily on
non-financial performance indicators as a means of
creating and demonstrating value before it could be
captured and realized. In the case of development
companies, these may be set up to commercialize a
technology for licensing but may face similar
challenges as they are required to move their
products closer to market or aim for a transition to
production [18].
In terms of value creation, all the companies had
sought to establish strategic alliances throughout the
value chain in order to provide the skills, compe-
tencies, and sometimes the investment to facilitate
the organizational transition. However, for the
product-focused companies this was often linked
to the capacity to modify or reorient their market
strategy through ‘probe-and-learn’ processes that
typify the iterative nature of innovation in the MDT
industry [7]. This was emphasized by several cases in
which adoption by practitioners or end users in
clinical practice often served as the beginning of an
iterative process of refinement and improvement
and as a precursor to selling in the early market.
Further downstream in the value chain the
demands of the marketing process meant that the
product companies needed to access the relevant
management and marketing capabilities and in
some cases sufficient resources to sustain a delayed
market entry process. Unlike new and approved
pharmaceutical products that are perhaps more
likely to be accepted by the market, the MDT case
studies showed that those companies involved in the
development and commercialization of highly in-
novative and technology-intensive products faced
additional marketing challenges, particularly those
companies seeking to introduce discontinuous in-
novations or disruptive technologies [15, 25–27, 29].
Marketing strategies, allied to the recruitment of
senior-level marketing and sales expertise that was
well networked to the target market, were frequently
based on a differentiated approach to targeting early
and mainstream customers [27, 29]. Their approach
has been to demonstrate early competitive advan-
tage and to establish leadership in niche markets
that can be used as a broader operational base. Their
approach also sought to establish relationships and
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collaborations with change agents or KOLs to
expedite the route to end users and the mainstream
market (practitioners in clinical practice) and which
often served as the beginning of an iterative process
of refinement and improvement of their products.
Many of these activities were aimed towards gaining
important information, sharing cost, analysing the
market, and responding to market demand [15].
These exploratory findings call for further investi-
gation. In considering strategic approaches for
creating value in the MDT sector, there is a need to
recognize the heterogeneity of MDT companies and
the distinctive features of the MDT innovation
process to understand better their influence on the
commercialization process, particularly the transi-
tions that determine access to financial and con-
sumer markets [15]. Building on the present authors’
[30] parallel study that has described a generic high-
level route map for health-care companies attempt-
ing to navigate the business growth trajectory, it is
necessary to develop lower-level route maps to
identify and assess the requirements for success
during different phases of product development and
organizational growth within the different parts of
the MDT industry. It is necessary to contrast these
with other parts of the health-care industry (namely
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology developers)
in order to help new MDT companies to recognize
and understand the differences in the value trajec-
tory for stakeholders, particularly the investors,
policy makers, and health-care-related decision
makers in today’s device industry [16, 31, 32].
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